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1 Introduction  
In our increasingly globalized and interconnected world, state actors almost 
immediately get aware of atrocities happening to people in other countries. When the 
international society is alerted to unfolding mass atrocities by a state directed towards 
its citizens, it is confronted with the choice between turning its back on the violations of 
human rights and to take necessary action to protect the victims.                                                                                                                                              
1.1 The Objectives of the study  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the principle of the responsibility to protect and 
its application in the United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 on the situation 
in Libya. Furthermore it will be discussed whether the coalition forces have carried out 
the military operations in Libya within the scope of resolution 1973.  
1.2 The Relevance of the study   
Following the revolution that unfolded in Tunisia and spread to Egypt in the early 
months of 2011, from February 15, civilians in Libya gathered for peaceful protests 
against the regime of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, calling for democratic reform and 
respect for human rights.1 The opposition group established the Interim Transitional 
National Council and enjoyed quick success in the beginning of the demonstrations. 
However, Qaddafi and his security forces responded by opening fire on crowds of 
peaceful demonstrators, and the situations in Libya rapidly turned into mass revolt.2 On 
February 18 the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, condemned 
the use of lethal force by security personnel in Libya, which had already led to the death 
of more than 20 protestors as well as hundreds of people being injured.3 The Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) also reported on beatings and 
other acts of ill-treatment and a number of people being arbitrarily detained.4 A number 
                                                 
1 OHCHR (18February2011)  
2 HRW (22february2011)  
3 OHCHR (18February2011)  
4 OHCHR (18February2011) 
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of Libyan government officials, diplomats and military officers left the Qaddafi regime 
in protest against the bloody crackdown on the demonstrators.5 By early March Qaddafi 
had lost control over most of the eastern part of the country, including the city of 
Benghazi. On the 5th of March 2011 the rebels reconstituted the National Transitional 
Council in Benghazi.6  
 
The OHCHR received reports about foreign 'mercenaries' in the killing of protesters, 
and there were grave concerns of arbitrary arrests of protesters including lawyers, 
human rights defenders and journalists.7 The Libyan government did also attempt to 
restrict the broadcasting of the situation in the country by cutting off landlines and 
internet access and restricting media coverage.8  
 
Condemnations of the violent suppression of Qaddafi mounted from both the UN and 
regional organizations. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon expressed his outrage 
over the reported use of warplanes and helicopters to fire at demonstrators.9 The UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights called for an immediate cessation of the human 
rights violations committed by Libyan authorities and said that the reported use of 
machine guns, snipers and military planes against the demonstrators was 
unconscionable.10 On February 22 the Arab League decided to suspend Libya from 
League meetings11 and on the same day the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
issued a statement saying that it ‘considers the ongoing coercion and oppression in 
Libya as a humanitarian catastrophe.’12 On February 24 the African Union condemned 
‘the disproportionate use of force’ against Libyan civilians.13  
 
                                                 
5 The Guardian (21February2011)   
6 National Transitional Council (2011) 
7 OHCHR (22February2011)  
8 OHCHR (22February2011)  
9 UN Doc. SG/SM/13408 
10 OHCHR (22February2011) 
11 UNNews (23February2011)  
12 CNSNews (23February2011)  
13 News24 (24February2011)  
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Regardless of the international condemnations, Qaddafi continued the brutal crackdown 
and called on his supporters to attack the demonstrators.14 On the other hand the 
protesters continued to challenge the Qaddafi-rule and called on the UN for protection.  
 
On February 25 the High Commissioner of Human Rights noted that the suppression of 
the protesters was escalating with shocking reports of arbitrary deprivation of life, 
arbitrary arrests, detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and ill treatment and even 
the use of foreign mercenaries.15 Libyan forces were firing at random protesters and 
bystanders from rooftops and from tanks. During the violent crackdown on 
demonstrators at the time, several hundred people died and thousands were injured.16 
Furthermore, the crisis in the country unleashed a flow of refugees, with the risk of 
further instability in other areas of the region.17  
 
The situation in Libya led the Security Council to unanimously adopt Security Council 
resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011. The Council expressed ‘grave concern at the 
situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,’ deplored the ‘gross and systematic violation 
of human rights’ and demanded ‘an immediate end to the violence.’18  Despite the 
implementation of measures pursuant to resolution 1970 and the condemnations by the 
Security Council and the regional organizations, the Libyan Government continued the 
brutalities against its own people. Reports revealed that the Libyan government had 
intensified its fighting, launched indiscriminate air strikes at civilians resulting in 
several killed and injured, had continued to detain journalists,19 in addition to reports of 
an immense passage of weapons throughout the Libyan territory.20   
 
On March 17, speaking on a radio show in Tripoli, Qaddafi raised the levels of urgency 
on the situation saying that his forces would begin an assault on the city of Benghazi the 
                                                 
14 Aljazeera (23February2011)   
15 OHCHR (25February2011)  
16 OHCHR (25February2011)  
17 OHCHR (14March2011)  
18 UN Doc. S/RES/1970 para.1 
19 OHCHR (10March2011)  
20 OHCHR (14March2011)  
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same night.21 ‘We will come house by house, room by room. It’s over. The issue has 
been decided,’ he said, offering amnesty to those who laid down their arms.22  
 
To avert a blood bath in Benghazi, the Security Council later on March 17 adopted 
resolution 1973 determining that the situation in Libya continued to ‘constitute[d] a 
threat to international peace and security’ and called for an immediate ‘cease-fire and a 
complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians’.23 The 
Council further authorized member nations to take “all necessary measures” to protect 
civilians.24 Resolution 1973 marks the first time the Security Council authorized the use 
of force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a functioning state.25  
 
Regardless of the passing of resolution 1973, the Libyan government continued to 
conduct offensive operations, and even increased these, against its people. On March 19 
an ad hoc coalition of states – including the United States, the United Kingdom and 
France – launched a number of airstrikes against military targets in Libya to enforce 
resolution 1973. By the end of March NATO, under Operation Unified Protector, had 
taken over the command of the international military operation in Libya.26  
 
Shortly after resolution 1973 was passed and the operation had begun, disagreements 
emerged as to how the mandate should be interpreted.  On the day the operations 
initiated, the Chinese government expressed regret at the American and European attack 
on Libya27 with Russia following up by condemning the attack.28 On March 27 NATO 
Secretary-General Rasmussen underlined that NATO Allies would implement all 
aspects of the UN resolution – ‘nothing more, nothing less’ – in order to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under attack or threat of attack from the Gaddafi 
                                                 
21 NYT (17March2011) 
22 NYT (17March2011) 
23 UN Doc. S/RES/1973 
24 UN Doc. S/RES/1973, para 4  
25 Bellamy (2011)   
26 NATO (2011), NATO and Libya - Operation Unified Protector 
27 The Guardian (19March2011) 
28 The Guardian (19March2011) 
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regime.29 None the less, both Russia and China, as well as the President of South 
Africa, Jacob Zuma, have on several occasions urged that the mandate should not be 
given an arbitrary interpretation30  and have expressed that NATO’s actions has 
overstepped the UN mandate in Libya.31  
 
After months of armed conflict between the pro-Qaddafi forces and the rebels, and the 
NATO military operation in the country, the NTC forces were by September in control 
of the capital city, Tripoli, in addition to the eastern and western areas of the country. 
On October 20 media reported that Qaddafi had been killed after an assault on his home 
town of Sirte. A number of videos have emerged on the internet in which he is pulled 
through the streets of Sirte, bloodied and unkempt and surrounded by jubilant rebels.32 
Precisely what happened next remains unclear but at some point Gaddafi was shot in 
the head.33  
 
On October 23 in Benghazi the leaders of the NTC made an official declaration of the 
liberation of Libya. After eight month of protests and fighting between the opposition 
forces and the pro-government forces the Qaddafi regime had ended.  
 
On October 27 BBC reported that the family of the deceased Qaddafi will file a war 
crimes complaint against NATO with the International Criminal Court.34 Also the 
President of South Africa has spoken that the Court should investigate the military 
operations carried out by NATO and its allies.35 On November 2 the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court said that the office will examine the allegations of crimes 
committed by NATO and the NTC-forces.36 
                                                 
29 NATO (2011), NATO and Libya - Operation Unified Protector 
30 UN Doc. S/PV.6528, p. 9 
31 France24 (15April2011)  
32 The Telegraph (20October2011)  
33 The Telegraph (20October2011)  
34 CNN Wire Staff (2011) 
35 NRK (9September2011) 
36 UN Doc. S/PV.6647  
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1.3 Methodology  
Security Council resolution 1973 constitutes the legal basis for the armed operation by 
NATO and its allies in Libya. In resolution 1973 the Security Council recalls its earlier 
resolution 1970, which together with resolution 1973 have a combined and cumulative 
effect. While the scope and limits of the authorization to use armed force in paragraph 4 
of resolution 1973 is the main focus for this thesis, resolution 1970 will be interpreted 
where it in combination with resolution 1973 makes the legal basis.  
 
The Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 will be interpreted in accordance with 
the applicable rules on interpretation of resolutions as set forth by the International 
Court of Justice in its Kosovo Declaration of Independence Advisory Opinion.37  
 
Relevant treaties for this thesis are the UN Charter, and treaties of international 
humanitarian law. The UN Charter governs the use of force in international relations, 
the rules of jus ad bellum, and Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 are adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter.  
 
Treaties of international humanitarian law are applicable as these set forth principles 
and rules which apply to situations of armed conflict, the rules of jus in bello.38 The 
crisis in Libya qualifies as an armed conflict as the pro-government forces and the 
rebels, as well as NATO use forceful measures against one another. The applicable 
international treaties of this thesis will be interpreted in occurrence with the provisions 
of interpretation in Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
 
Other related resolutions of the Security Council will also be analyzed, as will 
resolutions by and discussions at the General Assembly. Finally, relevant judicial 
decisions of international Courts will be referred to.  
                                                 
37 Kosovo Declaration of Independence, ICJ (2010), p. 34, para. 94   
38 Zwanenburg (2010) 
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1.4 Structure  
To achieve the above stated objectives, this thesis is separated into four parts. Part 1, the 
introduction, gives a brief overlook of the thesis. Part 2 provides for a discussion of the 
implementation of the responsibility to protect. Part 3 analyzes the legality of the 
military operations carried out in Libya. This part focuses on interpreting the scope of 
the Security Council resolution 1973. Finally, part 4 provides for a consideration of the 
effect the military operation in Libya might have on the international response to future 
humanitarian crisis.   
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2 The Responsibility to Protect  
In brief, the principle of the responsibility to protect recognizes that populations should 
be protected in certain situations of humanitarian disasters.  
2.1 Legal basis for the use of force  
The central rule on the use of force, the prohibition of the threat or use of force of 
member states in their international relations, is stipulated in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. The prohibition is not only a treaty obligation, it is also a rule of customary 
international law applying to all states.39  
  
Pursuant to Article 2(4), the threat or use of armed force in general in the international 
relations between states is prohibited.40 The text of the provision only deals with 
‘international relations’ and does not cover the use of force solely within a state.41 
Consequently the provision does not prohibit rebels from starting a civil war, nor the 
government concerned from using military force against them.42 In its Nicaragua case 
the Court stated that ‘the participation in acts of civil strife… in another State when the 
acts of civil strife… involve a threat or use of force’ is contrary to the prohibition of the 
use of force.43 The relations between groups undergoing a civil war and the 
participation of a second state are thus to be regarded as international relations and fall 
within the scope of Article 2(4).44  
  
The prohibition of the use of force following from Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and 
customary law is closely related to the principle of non-intervention. The latter principle 
is not explicitly enshrined in the UN Charter, but it has been affirmed as a principle of 
                                                 
39 Nicaragua v USA, para.174  
40 The Charter of the United Nations, a Commentary (2002) p. 117  
41 The Charter of the United Nations, a Commentary (2002) p. 121 
42 The Charter of the United Nations, a Commentary (2002) p. 121 
43 Nicaragua v USA, para.228 
44 The Charter of the United Nations, a Commentary (2002) p. 121 
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customary international law by the Court45 and by the UN General Assembly.46 The 
principle of non-intervention may furthermore implicitly be drawn from Article 2(1) 
and 2(7) of the UN Charter.  
 
In the Nicaragua case, the Court said that “the principle of non-intervention involves the 
right of every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference”. 47 
According to the principle of non-intervention all states are prohibited to intervene 
directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other states by coercive 
measures.48 Essentially, states shall not exercise their authority within the jurisdiction of 
other states.49 Sovereign states enjoy the sole jurisdiction over their own territory. In its 
Nicaragua case the Court concluded that acts constituting a breach of the customary 
principle of non-intervention will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of 
force, constitute a breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations.50 
 
The legal regime of the UN Charter provides for only two exceptions from the 
prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4), namely Security Council 
enforcement actions under Chapter VII and the right of individual and collective self-
defence against an armed attack pursuant to Art 51.  
 
By virtue of the duties of the Security Council under Article 24 of the UN Charter as 
having the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security’ and its powers under Article 39, the Security Council is entitled to determine 
the ‘existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’. The 
determination of the Security Council is a condition for the use of the particular 
measures provided for in Chapter VII.51 A decision taken under Article 39 may take the 
form of provisional measures under Article 40 or enforcement measures under Article 
                                                 
45 Nicaragua v USA, para.174 
46 UN Doc. UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV); UN Doc. UNGA Res 2131 (XX) 
47 Nicaragua v USA, para.202 
48 Nicaragua v USA, para.205  
49 Nardin (2006) 
50 Nicaragua v USA, para.209 
51 The Charter of the United Nations, a Commentary (2002) p.726  
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41 or 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Pursuant to Article 41 
the Council can take sanctions short of armed force. Should the Security Council decide 
that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have already proved to 
be inadequate, it can take measures involving armed force under Article 42.  
2.2 The challenge upon the international community  
The issue of external intervention for human protection purposes has since the end of 
the Cold War and until the present day presented the international community with 
controversial and challenging dilemmas. If there are massive atrocities, can sovereignty 
be forfeited on humanitarian grounds? Who decides whether the international 
community should act? What is the appropriate response?   
 
The 20th century has examples of failure of both the UN and the great powers to act 
when facing massive atrocities. During the Second World War there was the Holocaust. 
In 1994 the Rwanda genocide took place, where hundreds of thousands of Rwandans 
were slaughtered despite the forewarning of both the United Nations Assistance 
Mission in the area and the major powers about the massacre that was about to unfold.52 
The UN stood at the sideline and the situation in Rwanda became the symbol of 
international indifference and hardness.53  
 
A year later, in July 1995, the horror in Yugoslavia unfolded in Srebrenica where about 
7500 Bosnian males were taken from the town, a UN-protected ‘safe area’, and 
massacred. The crimes that took place were described by Kofi Annan, at the time UN 
Secretary-General, as ‘the worst on European soil since the Second World War’.54   
 
In March 1999 NATO began a military intervention in Kosovo without a prior Security 
Council authorization as the Council was unable to act due to internal disagreements. 
The 78 day period of aerial bombing was taken to forestall the ongoing humanitarian 
catastrophe in the area. The military operation for humanitarian purposes in Kosovo by 
                                                 
52 Thakur (2010), p.44 
53 Thakur (2010), p.44 
54 UN Doc. SG/SM/9993   
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NATO has seen a number of disapprovals as a blatant violation of international law. 
The NATO operation and the inaction of the Security Council initiated a more general 
debate about how to respond to massive and systematic violations of human rights, and 
when and by whom. 
 
In his speech before the United Nations General Assembly in 1999 and again in his 
Millennium Report to the at that time General Assembly, Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, raised the following question: ‘If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights?’55 
 
The struggle here is to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the prohibition of the 
threat or use of force and the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty and on 
the other hand, the international community’s duty to respond to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights.56  
 
In response to the challenge posed by the Secretary-General, the Government of Canada 
established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS).57 The mandate of this Commission was to develop a global political consensus 
on when, if ever, “it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military 
– action against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other 
state”  and under whose authority. In December 2001 the Commission presented its 
report entitled the Responsibility to Protect. The Commission made a broad framework 
with three essential elements, ‘the responsibility to prevent’, ‘the responsibility to react’ 
and ‘the responsibility to rebuild’,58 posing a continuum of graduated policy 
instruments across that spectrum. The ‘responsibility to react’ represents a model for 
taking an approach to humanitarian crises, from economic, political and military 
sanctions to military intervention as a last resort. 
                                                 
55 Annan (2000) para. 217  
56 Fiott (2008)  
57 Report of ICISS (2001)para.1.7  
58 Report of ICISS (2001)para.2.29  
  12 
 
The Commission embraced the concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ emphasizing 
that state sovereignty entails responsibilities as well as rights, whereas one such 
responsibility is to protect the fundamental rights of the people within its jurisdiction. 
The responsibility to protect acknowledges that the primary responsibility rests with the 
state concerned, but when a state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, it 
becomes the responsibility of the wider international community to act in its place.59 
This shows that only states which fulfill their sovereign responsibilities are entitled to 
the full specter of sovereign rights.  
2.3 Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect  
The Responsibility to Protect was unanimously affirmed by the large gathering of 
Heads of State and Government at the UN World Summit on 14 September 2005.60 In 
paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome Document, the assembled world leaders 
recognized the responsibility of each individual state to protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, often called 
atrocities.  
 
Should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect 
their populations from the four specified crimes, the international community is 
prepared to take ‘collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council’ under Chapter VII, in accordance with the Charter, ‘on a case-by-case 
basis.’61 Military action can only be taken as a last resort and Security Council 
authorization is necessary.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 Report of ICISS (2001)para.2.29 
60 UN Doc.A/RES60/1  
61 UN Doc.A/RES60/1,para.139  
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3 Are the military operations in Libya carried out within the scope of 
resolution 1973?  
Having established the framework of the collective security system and the 
responsibility to protect, the analysis will now turn to a case study of the situation in 
Libya and examine the legal framework for the military intervention and the legality of 
some of the actions carried out by the coalition forces.             
3.1 Measures authorized in Resolution 1970 and 1973  
In the resolution the Council specifically invokes ‘the Libyan authorities` responsibility 
to protect its population’ and emphasizes its strong commitment to ‘the sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’. 
With awareness of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council chooses to act 
under Chapter VII and demands ‘an immediate end to the violence’. The Council adopts 
a series of coercive measures on Libya, short of the use of armed force under its Article 
41. First, the Council refers the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court. Secondly, the Council imposes an arms embargo on the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya. Thirdly, targeted sanctions are imposed on Qaddafi, members of his family 
and his accomplices, including travel ban and asset freeze. Finally, the Council 
establishes a sanctions committee. From the range of measures taken in Resolution 
1970 it seems as if these are designed to be preventive to discourage Qaddafi and those 
around him from committing atrocities, as well as to ensure that the conflict does not 
escalate.  
 
Security Council Resolution 1973 was adopted by a vote of 10 in favor to none against, 
with 5 abstentions, Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia. In resolution 1973 the 
Council first deplores ‘the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 
1970’ and expresses its concern for the ‘deteriorating situation, the escalation of 
violence and the heavy civilian causalities’. Further, the Council underlines ‘the 
responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population’. The Council 
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then expresses ‘its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian 
populated areas’. These phrases show that it is the obligation of the state to protect its 
population, but when the state fails, the Council will secure civilian protection, although 
it has not articulated that it has an obligation to do so. The above mentioned phrases 
demonstrate that Resolution 1973 is about defending the civilian population against 
attacks from the population’s own authorities. 
 
The Council once more reaffirms its ‘strong commitment to the sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,’ 
underscoring that the resolution is not about invading, dividing, undermining or 
dismembering Libya. The Council then states that it will act ‘under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations’ which enables a continuation of coercive measures. The 
Council authorizes ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians in Libya, to enforce the 
arms embargo established under resolution 1970 and to enforce the imposed no-fly-
zone as well as strengthening the sanctions regime of resolution 1970 and establishing a 
panel of experts.  
 
Contrary to its reference to Article 41 of the UN Charter as the legal basis in resolution 
1970, the Council does not specify the precise legal basis in resolution 1973. When the 
Council in resolution 1973 deplores that resolution 1970 was not complied with and 
thus acknowledges that the measures under Article 41 were inadequate and again acts 
under Chapter VII, this time without specifying under which Article, it shows that the 
Council acts under Article 42 and authorizes the use of armed force.   
 
In both resolutions 1970 and 1973, the Security Council uses the language of the 
Responsibility to Protect, when it insists on the responsibility of the Libyan authorities 
to protect the Libyan population. The two resolutions further invoke the responsibility 
to protect when these in the preambles consider that ‘the widespread and systematic 
attacks’ against the civilian population in Libya ‘may amount to crimes against 
humanity’, which are among the four categories of crimes the doctrine of the 
responsibility to protect determines that populations shall be protected from.62 The 
                                                 
62 UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 para.138,139 
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recent crisis in Libya has put the responsibility to protect as an operational principle to 
the test.  
3.2 Questions concerning the legality of the coalition’s acts in Libya 
Controversial debates about the legality and the legitimacy of the military intervention 
in Libya in pursuance of the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1970 and 
1973 have been initiated. The interpretation of the scope and the limits of the two 
resolutions and which military actions these permit have turned into a contentious 
matter. Among the questions which have been raised is whether resolution 1973 
justifies the targeting of the Qaddafi regime, whether the coalition forces lawfully can 
arm the Libyan rebels and whether resolution 1973 allows for the coalition to deploy 
ground forces on Libyan territory. The thesis will in the following discuss these issues.  
3.3 The legality of targeting the Qaddafi regime     
On March 21 2011, BCC reported that during the second night of missile strikes, on 
Sunday March 20, Qaddafi's Bab al-Aziziya complex was hit.63 The strike on the Bab 
al-Aziziya complex raised questions about how far resolution 1973 permitted the 
coalition acting in Libya to go considering military action directed against the Qaddafi 
regime. Differing opinions were being put forth concerning whether the resolution 
permitted the coalition to target the Qaddafi regime, thus the legality of actions ranging 
from the targeting of the forces of Qaddafi to targeting Qaddafi in person and whether 
resolution 1973 in fact opened up for a forcible regime change in Libya.  
 
During the armed conflict in Libya, the intensity of the military actions carried out by 
the coalition forces towards the Qaddafi regime has seen an increase. On May 4, Grete 
Faremo, at that time the Norwegian Minister of Defence, held that Operation Unified 
Protector, with NATO in command, was separated into three phases.64 In the first 
phase, NATO and its allies focused on various ground-based devices and systems that 
constituted an immediate threat to the civilian population.65 Airstrikes were launched at 
Qaddafi’s forces advancing on Benghazi and other cities and at masses of his forces 
                                                 
63 Kuenssberg (2011)  
64 Faremo (2011)  
65 Faremo (2011)  
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within these areas. In the second phase, NATO focused on strategic goals of importance 
for the regime’s capability of command and control.66  
 
Faremo held that the final phase will focus on ensuring that the regime will comply with 
the resolutions of the Security Council. The third phase of the armed conflict has not 
been as envisaged and in this phase NATO and its allies have carried out even more 
intense military actions than in the two earlier phases. While the rebels advanced on 
cities held by the pro-government forces such as Tripoli in the end of August,67 Bani 
Walid in Mid-September68 and Sirte in the end of September,69 NATO launched air 
strikes at the same areas. It has also been held that NATO has directed strikes towards 
Qaddafi himself and his family.70   
 
For the purpose of discussing the legality of NATO’s operation directed at the Qaddafi 
regime, each of the three above described phases will be considered separately.  
 
Both the customary rule of non-intervention in international affairs and the prohibition 
on the use of force in international relations pursuant to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
forbid any form of armed intervention in the territory of another state. These rules 
clearly cover the armed operations carried out by NATO on Libyan territory in all three 
phases. Absent an authorization in Security Council resolution 1973 permitting military 
operations directed towards the Qaddafi regime, the operation by NATO would violate 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the rule of non-intervention.  
 
As the enforcement of resolution 1973 contemplates the use of armed force by a 
coalition of states against the state of Libya, the military measures taken are also 
governed by international humanitarian law.71 Regardless of Article 103 of the UN 
Charter, it was reiterated in a Secretary-General’s Bulletin entitled ‘Observance by 
                                                 
66 Faremo (2011)  
67 BBC News (21August2011)  
68 NRK (9October2011)  
69 BBC News (28September2011)  
70 BBC News (1May2011)  
71 Schmitt (2011)  
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United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law’ that the fundamental 
principles and rules of international humanitarian law are applicable to Chapter VII 
enforcement actions,72 which necessarily include operations taken to implement 
resolution 1973. NATO and its allies must comply with international humanitarian law 
when carrying out resolution 1973.   
 
The relevant principles and rules of international humanitarian law are set forth in the 
provisions of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. The principle of 
distinction expressed in Article 48 of the Protocol, stipulates that belligerents shall 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly ‘shall direct their operations only against 
military objectives’. Article 52 defines ‘military objectives’ as those which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use ‘make an effective contribution to military action’ and 
whose destruction, capture or neutralization, at the time, ‘offers a definite military 
advantage.’ International humanitarian law thus requires that the Qaddafi regime, 
including the pro-government forces, command and control centers and Qaddafi in 
person, is a legitimate military objective in order to be targeted. In addition the rules of 
proportionality73 and the requirement to take ‘precautions in attack’74 apply fully.   
This thesis will discuss whether NATO’s military action directed towards the Qaddafi 
regime in the three phases is within the scope of the mandate of Security Council 
resolution 1973. The further discussion is based on the assumption that international 
humanitarian law is complied with.  
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3.3.1 Airstrikes directed at Qaddafi’s advancing forces 
The thesis will now address the question of whether NATO and its allies have acted 
within the mandate of Security Council resolution 1973, in the first phase of the 
conflict, when launching airstrikes at Qaddafi’s forces advancing on Benghazi and other 
cities and at masses of his forces within these areas.  
 
The specific legal starting point is paragraph 4 of resolution 1973. The provision 
authorizes Member States ‘to take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including 
Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory.’  
 
In the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice set applicable rules 
of interpretation of Security Council Resolutions.75 The Court first noted that ‘the rules 
on treaty interpretation embodied in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties may provide guidance.’ The Court further said that ‘the interpretation 
of Security Council resolutions also requires that other factors be taken into account.’  
 
The interpretation may require an analysis of ‘statements by representatives of members 
of the Security Council made at the time of their adoption, other resolutions of the 
Security Council on the same issue as well as the subsequent practice of relevant United 
Nations organs and of States affected by those given resolutions.’ Still, as noted by the 
Permanent Court ‘it is an established principle that the right of giving an authoritative 
interpretation of a legal rule belongs solely to the… body who has the power to modify 
or suppress it.’76 This is to say that only the Security Council, or a body authorized to 
do so by the Council, has the authority to give an official interpretation of disputed 
terms in Security Council resolution 1973.  
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While the International Court of Justice set forth factors applicable in the process of 
interpretation of Security Council resolutions, it did not refer to decisions of 
international courts. The Court has in a number of cases interpreted Security Council 
resolutions and clearly its decisions are relevant factors for interpretation. This indicates 
that the list of factors set forth by the Court is not intended to be a complete list of 
applicable factors. That the list of factors does not make an exhaustive list is supported 
by the vague language the Court uses to describe the relevant factors, by first merely 
making a reference to the rules in the Vienna Convention, Article 31 and 32, saying that 
these ‘may provide guidance’, then stating that the interpretation also requires ‘that 
other factors be taken into account’ and finally mentioning four factors that the 
interpretation ‘may require the Court to analyze.’   
 
In the following, when interpreting resolution 1973, the factors of interpretation as set 
forth by the Court in its Kosovo Advisory Opinion, in addition to other relevant factors, 
will be clarified and applied.  
  
The approach in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention suggests that the resolution 
shall be interpreted in accordance with ‘the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
[the resolution] in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ What are to 
be considered as ‘the terms’ mentioned in Article 31 (1) are the unnumbered preamble 
paragraphs, the numbered operative paragraphs and the two annexes of resolution 1973. 
Distinction must be drawn between the preamble and the operative paragraphs, as only 
the latter are agreed upon to determine the rights and duties of the ones concerned. The 
operative paragraphs are thus of greatest importance. As resolution 1973 recalls 
resolution 1970 on the same matter, and the two have a combined effect of the situation 
in Libya, also resolution 1970 is included in the ‘terms’ of resolution 1973. In the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the Court explicitly stated that such other resolutions on the 
same issue may be analyzed.  
 
That the terms of resolution 1973 shall be interpreted in accordance with their ‘ordinary 
meaning,’ means in the common or literal sense of the words.   
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First, paragraph 4 authorizes Member States to take ‘all necessary measures’ – to use 
military force – ‘to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack 
in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi’. The word ‘to’ is synonymous with 
‘in order to’, ‘so as to’ and ‘so that’ and thus expresses purpose or intention. In 
paragraph 4 the word ‘to’ expressly links the use of all necessary measures with 
protection of civilians and civilian populated areas. An ordinary understanding of the 
phrase implies that paragraph 4 authorizes the use of all necessary measures – the use of 
armed force – when taken to achieve the purpose or intention of protection of civilians 
and civilian populated areas.  
 
Importantly, the mandate here portrays a distinction between the measures to be used 
and the aim to be achieved. The mandate only licenses the use of all necessary measures 
to achieve the specified objective of protection. The scope of the use of armed force is 
thus limited to the objective that the use of force is designed to achieve; ‘to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack…, including Benghazi’. The 
conduct of military operations to achieve other objectives or aims goes beyond 
paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1973 and would amount to an unlawful 
‘threat or use of force’ against the targeted state, in breach of Article 2(4) of the 
Charter.   
 
The next issue to address is the content of, and the internal relations between the objects 
of protection in paragraph 4, namely ‘civilians and civilian populated areas…, including 
Benghazi’.  
 
The first object of protection is ‘civilians’. In the Oxford English Dictionary a ‘civilian’ 
is described as a person who is not professionally employed in the armed forces, that is 
to say a non-military person.  
 
Further guidance as to who is covered by the term ‘civilians’ follows from Additional 
Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. As Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention 
suggests recourse to ‘any relevant rules of international law’ in the process of 
interpretation, provisions of international conventions as Additional Protocol I of the 
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Geneva Conventions may be taken into account.77 The extent to which the terms of 
resolution 1973 may be interpreted taking into account the content given to similar 
terms in international law, depends on the intention of the Security Council, as 
demonstrated by the text of the resolution and the surrounding circumstances.78 If it 
appears that the Security Council was intending to base itself on the content of a similar 
term in international law, the phrase shall be interpreted taken that content into account. 
Contrariwise, if the Council was intending to lay down some content regardless of the 
prior content of similar phrases, than that intention shall prevail.79  
 
Article 50 (1) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions identifies a civilian 
as ‘any person who does not belong to… article 43 of this Protocol.’ Article 43, 
paragraph 2 decides that ‘members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict are 
combatants.’ Armed forces of a Party to a conflict are defined in paragraph 1 of the 
article as to consist of ‘all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a 
command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates.’ As civilians are 
all but those covered by the term combatants, civilians are those who do not participate 
in the armed forces of any party of the conflict.    
 
The residents of Benghazi and other areas of Libya who do not fight with the armed 
forces on either side of the conflict are therefore covered by the term ‘civilians.’ The 
rebel forces fighting against Qaddafi are however not covered by the term.  
 
As resolution 1973 does not provide for a specific description of the term ‘civilians’ and 
thus does not seem to divert from the content the term is given in other rules of 
international law, the content set forth in Additional Protocol I supplements resolution 
1973.   
 
Paragraph 4 is not only about protecting civilians but also about protecting ‘civilian 
populated areas.’ The term shows that it is about protecting specific geographical zones 
                                                 
77 The Statute of the International Court of Justice Article 38(1)(a) 
78 Wood (1998) 
79 Wood (1998) 
  23 
or areas that contain civilians, which include cities and towns. The phrase allows for 
protection of such areas regardless of whether the attacks are being directed at civilians 
or at what would be legitimate military objects under international humanitarian law.80 
In principle the phrase allows for protection of those fighting at both sides of the war.     
 
In its Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the Court also noted that guidance in the interpretation 
could be taken from ‘statements by representatives of members of the Security Council 
made at the time of their adoption,’ meaning in the Council meeting where the 
resolution was adopted.81 In his introduction of the draft resolution in the meeting 
where resolution 1973 was adopted, the representative of France said that the draft 
authorizes Member States to resort to all necessary measures ‘to protect civilians and 
territories.’82 By simply referring to territories instead of ‘civilian populated areas’ the 
statement of the French representative supports that the latter phrase is about protecting 
specific geographical zones.  
 
The phrase ‘civilian populated areas’ thus extends the mandate from merely protecting 
civilians to authorize protection of all civilian populated territories and thus also cities 
and towns held by rebel forces.   
 
Paragraph 4 further reads ‘including Benghazi.’ The word ‘including’ means to 
comprise or contain. The expression ‘including Benghazi’ seems to explicitly highlight 
that the coalition forces will focus on the protection of the city of Benghazi.  
 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention suggests that circumstances around the adoption of 
the resolution may provide guidance in the interpretation. Earlier on the day the 
resolution 1973 was passed, pro-Qaddafi forces had advanced within striking distance 
of the rebel-held city of Benghazi and the rebels asked for military protection.83 On 
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state television Qaddafi promised a ruthless assault on the city.84 ‘We will chase the 
traitors from Benghazi. Destroy their fortifications. Show them no mercy,’ Qaddafi said 
to his forces.85  
 
These circumstances created an urgent need for protection, especially of the city of 
Benghazi. By making a particular reference to the city of Benghazi in resolution 1973, 
the Security Council sends a clear message to Qaddafi. If Qaddafi does not pull back his 
forces from attacking Benghazi, the member states will use forcible measures to protect 
the city. The inclusion of the words ‘including Benghazi’ in the text of the resolution 
does not narrow the scope of the objects the resolution sought to protect. On the 
contrary, it especially underscores the urgent need to protect lives and to prevent further 
bloodshed about to occur in Benghazi.   
 
Statements from members present in the meeting where resolution 1973 was adopted 
further shed light on the meaning of the phrase ‘including Benghazi.’86 The 
representative of France said that the resolution authorizes measures ‘to protect civilians 
and territories, including Benghazi, that are under the threat of attack by Colonel Al-
Qaddafi’s forces.’ By comprising Benghazi under the term ‘civilians and territories,’ the 
statement indicates that the city of Benghazi is among the territories to be protected by 
the mandate. Furthermore, the protection is needed due to the threat of attack posed by 
Qaddafi’s forces. The representative also underscored that ‘every hour and day that 
goes by means a further clampdown and repression for the freedom-loving civilian 
population, in particular the people of Benghazi.’87 The representative of the UK, 
another of the contributors to the draft, focused on the urgent need for the resolution, as 
the Qaddafi-regime at the time were ‘preparing for a violent assault on a city of one 
million people that has a history dating back 2,500 years,’88 referring to Benghazi.  
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In brief, the expression ‘to protect civilians and civilian populated areas…, including 
Benghazi’ thus comprises protection of all civilians, the city of Benghazi, as well as 
other cities and towns including Ajdabiya and Misrata.  
 
Paragraph 4 states that NATO and its allies are only licensed to protect these objects 
when they are ‘under threat of attack.’ The next issue to be determined is thus whether 
these areas are ‘under threat of attack.’  
  
The expression ‘under threat of attack’ shows that the mandate is not only about ending 
actual attacks, it reaches to protection of civilians under the mere threat of an attack. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the noun ‘threat’ means pressure, danger 
or peril. It further denotes a ‘declaration of hostile determination…; a menace.’ The 
word ‘menace’ signifies ‘a declaration or indication of hostile intention, or of a 
probable evil or catastrophe; a threat.’ This indicates that a ‘threat’ involves a form of 
communication of a hostile intent, and that this communication must contain a reference 
to an evil or catastrophe.89 
 
Not every possible hostile communication will qualify as a threat. There must be an 
adequate connection between the communication of the hostile intention and the danger 
it signals. The text of the resolution does not specify whether the threat must be direct, 
obvious or imminent. As the text does not in itself set forth these requirements, it could 
indicate that such requirements are not necessary.  
 
Other relevant factors may shed light on the content of the term ‘threat’ as used in 
Paragraph 4 of resolution 1973. According to Article 31(3) (c) of the Vienna              
Convention ‘any relevant rules of international law’ may provide guidance in the 
process of interpretation, which include provisions of the UN Charter. In Article 2(4) of 
the Charter, the term ‘threat’ is used in the context of ‘threat or use of force.’ The UN 
Charter has not in itself provided for a description of the term ‘threat.’90 When speaking 
about a ‘threat’ in relation to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter in the Nuclear Advisory 
                                                 
89 Stürchler (2007) p.37 
90 Wood (2009) 
  26 
Opinion the Court used the words ‘declared readiness of a State to use force.’91 Also 
Stürchler, who has made an evaluation of the practice of states and the United Nations 
in respect of ‘threat’ in Article 2(4), emphasizes that in order for there to be a violation 
of Article 2(4), a state must ‘credibly communicate its readiness to use force in a 
particular dispute.’92 This communication may be expressed or implied.93 Stürchler 
argues that ‘what matters is that the use of force is sufficiently alluded to and thereby 
increases the shared risk of military encounter,’ there is no requirement of certainty that 
force will be used or that it is imminent.94  
 
The extent to which the content of the term ‘threat’ as laid down in respect of Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter provides guidance for the similar term ‘under threat’ in Security 
Council resolution 1973 depends on the intentions of the Security Council.95 In the 
Security Council meeting where resolution 1973 was adopted, the representative of 
Colombia touched upon the content of the phrase ‘under threat of attack. Colombia 
underscored that it ‘voted in favor of measures that are aimed at protecting the civilian 
population from imminent attacks by a Government.’ By using the term ‘from imminent 
attacks’ instead of the expression ‘under threat of attack’ as in paragraph 4 of resolution 
1973, the representative of Colombia implies that the mandate only covers situations 
where the attack is imminent. Phrases of similar content as imminent are ‘about or 
ready to happen,’ ‘near at hand in its incidence’ and ‘coming on shortly.’ The term 
‘imminent attack’ thus significantly narrows the scope of situations the member states 
can react to compared to the term ‘under threat of attack.’ The importance of the 
statement of Colombia is limited as this is the sole state in the Council meeting that 
utters this point of view. However, it does shed some light on the content of the 
expression ‘under threat of attack’ in that a threat does not cover any possible attack in 
the future ac some closeness to an attack must be established. Since the other members 
of the Council did not intend to deviate from the content of the technical term ‘threat’ in 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and as to take guidance from this rule will promote 
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harmony in the legal framework on the field, the content given to the term ‘threat’ in 
Article 2(4) is relevant in the interpretation.   
 
An ordinary reading of the term ‘under threat,’ with guidance taken from the term 
‘threat’ in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and to some degree the opinion of Colombia, 
indicate that the term ‘under threat of attack’ in paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 requires 
that a coercive intent to carry out an attack has been credibly communicated in some 
way, but it does not have to be definite that an attack will incur, nor does the attack 
need to be imminent. Even though imminence is not required, some form of adequate 
connection to an attack must be established.  
  
The threat that paragraph 4 refers to is the incident of an ‘attack.’ The ordinary 
understanding of the word ‘attack’ implies a violent attempt to defeat, hurt or overcome 
somebody or something.96  
 
Other relevant rules of international law may provide guidance to the interpretation of 
the term ‘attack.’97 Article 51 of the UN Charter uses the term ‘attack’ when stipulating 
that an ‘armed attack’ is a condition for the exercise of the right of self-defence. No 
definition for the concept of ‘armed attack’ can be found in the UN Charter. However in 
its Nicaragua case the Court remarked that one must distinguish ‘the most grave forms 
of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms.’98 
The Court also focused on the ‘scale and effects’ of an armed attack to distinguish it 
from a ‘mere frontier incident.’99  
 
These criteria of a certain graveness and the scale and effects of the force are set forth 
specifically for the narrow scope of armed operations that justifies the right of self-
defence. Indeed, in its Nicaragua case the Court underscored that armed operations that 
qualify as a ‘use of force’ in Article 2(4) do not necessarily also qualify as an ‘armed 
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attack’ in relation to Article 51.100 The threshold of the term ‘armed attack’ is thus set 
quite high. Whether the content of the term ‘attack’, as laid down in paragraph 4 of 
resolution 1973, gives guidance on the term ‘attack’ in paragraph 4 of resolution 1973, 
depends on the intentions of the Security Council.  
 
In the Council meeting where resolution 1973 was adopted, the majority of the 
representatives of member states emphasized that the purpose of the resolution was to 
protect civilians and end the violence inflicted on the Libyan civilians by Qaddafi. The 
representative of Lebanon hoped that the resolution would make ‘Libyan authorities 
move away from using all forms of violence against their own people’ and the South 
African representative said that the aim of the resolution was to protect those ‘who are 
faced with brutal acts of violence carried out by the Libyan authorities.’ The purpose of 
protecting civilians against all forms of violence, shows that the term ‘attack’ in 
paragraph 4 is not intended to be interpreted as strictly as in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, but merely as referring to all forms of violence and harm the Qaddafi regime 
inflicts on the civilian population of Libya.101 
 
The issue to determine is then whether the city of Ajdabiya, Misrata and Benghazi were 
‘under threat of attack’.  
 
In his speech on Libyan television on February 22 Qaddafi clearly communicated his 
coercive intent on attacking the rebels. Qaddafi referred to them as ‘cockroaches’ and 
vowed to fight to his ‘last drop of blood.’102 This speech showed that Qaddafi would 
fight against all rebels in Libya.  
 
On March 16, the pro-Qaddafi forces had already surrounded and made their first 
attacks on the city of Ajdabiya.103 In Misrata, by March 22 pro-Qaddafi forces had 
moved their armor into the city to make it harder to hit them from the air and the forces 
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had snipers on rooftops and tanks in the city center.104 The city had already been under 
attack for several days. Both the cities of Ajdabiya and Misrata were in fact already 
under attack, and it is thus clear that airborne actions by NATO and its allies striking at 
concentrations of forces in areas within and around the city were within the mandate of 
resolution 1973.  
 
When it comes to Benghazi, Qaddafi had on March 17 explicitly communicated a 
vicious intent of attacking the city if the rebels did not surrender.105 Seen in 
combination with the masses of armed forces advancing within striking distance of the 
city on the verge of storming the territory and with Qaddafi’s record of violence against 
civilians there was clearly a risk of even an imminent attack on Benghazi.  
 
A violent attack as envisioned by Qaddafi on the city of Benghazi and its one million 
people would possibly result in a number of casualties and civilians left without shelter 
and thus constitute as a grave attack.  
 
The airstrikes conducted by NATO and its allies at the armed forces of Qaddafi 
advancing on Benghazi are thus within the mandate of resolution 1973. 
 
In conclusion, airstrikes directed at tanks and columns of pro-government forces 
advancing on rebel-held areas, as well as concentrations of forces within those areas are 
justified within the scope of Security Council resolution 1973.  
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3.3.2 Airstrikes launched at strategic goals    
The discussion will here address the legality of the military operations directed at 
strategic goals of importance for the Qaddafi regime’s capability of command and 
control, conducted in phase two of the conflict. Among these military operations were 
the airstrikes on March 21 at Qaddafi’s command center in Tripoli106 and on April 25 at 
Qaddafi’s Bab al-Azizia compound.107   
 
Paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 authorizes the use of armed force in pursuance of 
protecting ‘civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.’  
 
As established under 3.3.1, in order for there to be a threat, a coercive intent must have 
been communicated in some way. During the uprising in Libya, Qaddafi made several 
speeches where he explicitly promised to use force against those who opposed him. 
Broadcasted on Libyan television on March 19, Qaddafi said he would arm all civilians 
to defend Libya from what he called ‘crusader aggression’ by Western forces.108 In his 
speech Qaddafi also issued a warning of the danger to civilians in the whole region, 
when saying that ‘the interests of countries face danger from now on in the 
Mediterranean because of this aggressive and mad behavior.’109 The speeches of 
Qaddafi, as well as his demonstrated capability to use force since the war started and 
also his continued attacks on his own people showed that Qaddafi would not end the 
attacks. This thus amounts to a communicated threat of attack.    
 
The airstrikes at the command and control centers raise the question of how remote the 
connection between the threat of attack and those posing it may be.110  
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The phrase ‘under threat of attack’ goes beyond the need to establish a definite link to 
an actual attack. As established under 3.3.2, even though imminence is not required, 
some form of adequate connection must be established between the threat of attack and 
those posing it. The wording ‘under threat’ does not only seem to permit military 
response to imminent or direct threats of attacks, also more distant and indirect threats 
appear to be covered by the mandate.111 When the mandate seems to cover protection 
also against more indirect and remote threats, this includes operations that support, or 
reasonably could be expected to support, such attacks on the civilian population.112 
 
In its Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the Court said that also ‘subsequent practice… of 
States affected by [the] given resolutions,’ is a relevant factor when interpreting 
resolutions.113 This is also emphasized in Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention. 
Not only actual practice should be considered in the interpretation but also the non-
performance, the practice of not doing something that others do should be taken into 
account as also this kind of practice provides information on how the states understand 
the resolution. As the Court uses the word ‘practice’ and not ‘statement’ it indicates that 
it is the actual practice, or non-practice, in contrast to the opinion juris of states that is 
of interest. When considered together with the actual practice of the state, prior or 
succeeding statements may nevertheless enlighten the actual practice of the state and 
may thus be taken into account. ‘States affected’ by resolution 1973 are the states that 
are more or less involved in the situation in Libya, which necessarily includes states 
enforcing the mandate. UK, Norway as well as other states within the NATO alliance 
have launched airstrikes at pro-Qaddafi command and control centers,114 including TV 
satellite transmission dishes used for communication.115 Both UK and Norway have 
publicly expressed their opinion that these airstrikes were carried out within the 
mandate of resolution 1973.  
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UK Prime Minister David Cameron explained that the airstrikes are ‘about preventing a 
loss of civilian life by targeting Qaddafi's war-making machine,116 which he said also 
covered command and control. The at the time Norwegian Minister of Defence, Grete 
Faremo, argued that the airstrikes at these command and control centres would break 
down Qaddafi’s ability to harm civilians, but not crush the regime.117 Faremo 
emphasized that these attacks were about weakening Qaddafi’s military capabilities, 
which he has used towards his own people.118 Faremo also emphasized that to break 
down the military capabilities of the regime was not the same as to crush the regime. 
The at that time Norwegian Secretary of State, Espen Barth Eide, underscored that the 
objective of the resolution was to protect civilians, and that to use military measures to 
achieve that Qaddafi resigned was not within the scope of the resolution.119  
 
There might seem to be a contradiction in the statements of Faremo and Eide, in that on 
the one hand, military measures could not be used to force Qaddafi to resign, and on the 
other hand armed force could be used to eliminate Qaddafi’s military capabilities as 
these posed a threat against civilians. In both scenarios the military measures were 
directed towards the Qaddafi regime. However, to seek to eliminate the devices Qaddafi 
used in the attacks of his people and to remove of Qaddafi himself does not seem to be 
exactly the same. If one eliminated the war-making devises of Qaddafi that posed a 
threat on the civilian population, in consequence Qaddafi would no longer be able to 
attack his people. Then it would be for the Libyan people to decide whether Qaddafi 
should resign from power.    
 
Also NATO has on several occasions uttered its opinion on the actions carried out by 
the alliance. Whether practice of NATO as a unit is relevant in terms of ‘subsequent 
practice of … States affected by those given resolutions’ depends on the rules of 
engagement between NATO and the countries enforcing the mandate, i.e. in which 
degree the countries acting out the mandate may decide whether they want to participate 
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on a particular operation or not. On March 28, Oana Lungescu, a spokesperson for 
NATO said that NATO would not go into the details on the rules of engagement, other 
than saying that all twenty eight allies agree to the rules.120 The rules of engagement are 
thus not known for the public. Nevertheless, NATO is in command of the military 
operations enforcing resolution 1973 in Libya and makes a forum for the member states 
to discuss the military operation. When representatives of NATO make announcements, 
it is on behalf of its member states. The practice of NATO is thus of relevance as a 
factor of interpretation.  
 
With regard to the targeting of the communicational infrastructure and the headquarters 
of Qaddafi, Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard stated that ‘NATO will continue its 
campaign to degrade the Qaddafi regime forces that are involved in the ongoing attacks 
on civilians.’121 The NATO alliance has also announced that NATO's strategy of 
launching strikes at these centers has been to disrupt and destroy the command and 
control of those forces.122 NATO thus opinions, in similar language as the UK and 
Norway, that airstrikes directed at command and control centers are within the objective 
of the mandate of civilian protection as these centers are involved in operations that put 
the civilian population at risk.  
 
While these countries continued the airstrikes at command and control centers, both 
Russia and China expressed concern about NATO’s perceived military overreach. 
Russia and China did not participate in the enforcement of resolution 1973 and were 
therefore not directly ‘affected’ by the resolution. However, as permanent members of 
the Security Council, the two countries had the opportunity to give a negative vote on 
the draft resolution, i.e. to veto the draft and thus avert the resolution from being 
passed.123 Being in a substantial degree of control over the adoption of the resolution, 
the permanent members should be regarded as affected by the resolution even when not 
participating in its enforcement. The subsequent practice of China and Russia is 
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therefore of importance. On April 15, the day after the allies met and discussed the 
military operations in Libya on the Berlin conference, as a warning to the alliance not to 
use excessive force, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, underscored that ‘The 
UN has not authorized regime change.’124 NATO Secretary-General, Rasmussen, 
quickly responded that NATO's forces were acting ‘in strict conformity with both the 
spirit and the letter of the UN Security Council motion’125 and that NATO would 
continue its precision bombing raids.126 
 
The countries that were debating the legality of airstrikes directed at Qaddafi’s 
command and control centers seemed to be divided, as one group argued that the 
airstrikes were conducted to protect the civilian population, while the opposition argued 
that the airstrikes were directed towards a regime change.  
 
As underscored by Norway, the UK and NATO, the actual use of the command and 
control centers facilitated communication and military orders between Qaddafi’s forces. 
These centers thus made an effective contribution on Qaddafi’s military capabilities to 
attack his own people. Wiping out the command and control centers would weaken the 
coordination of the pro-Qaddafi forces, and thus the threat these posed on the civilian 
population. As the command and control centers were involved in operations that put 
the civilian population at risk, these centers themselves posed an indirect threat on the 
Libyan population. Eliminating these centers was not about removing Qaddafi, but 
about reducing his devices for attacking civilians.   
 
The discussion thus shows that the command and control centers are sufficiently 
connected to the threat of attack on the civilian population in Libya. The airstrikes 
launched at these devices are within the objective of paragraph 4 of resolution 1973.  
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In conclusion, airstrikes directed at strategic goals of importance for the Qaddafi 
regime’s capability of command and control are justified within the scope of Security 
Council resolution 1973.  
3.3.3 Airstrikes directed at Qaddafi’s forces as the rebels advanced   
The thesis will now address the legality of the airstrikes carried out by the coalition 
forces as the rebels advanced on Qaddafi-held territories, including Tripoli, Bani Walid 
and Sirte, phase three.  
 
Paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 only permits military operations taken in order ‘to 
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.’ Forcible measures 
cannot be used in pursuance of other objectives.  
 
On the one hand, in paragraph 2 of resolution 1973 the Council underscores the need to 
find a solution to the crisis which ‘responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan 
people.’ The Council was certainly aware of that the demands of the people of Libya, 
especially the rebels, were for Qaddafi to resign and instead to have a regime that 
respects human rights. Moreover, Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 do in 
several of the preamble paragraphs deplore and condemn the violations of human rights 
in Libya and the failure of the Libyan authorities to protect its own people. On the other 
hand, neither in paragraph 2 nor in the preamble paragraphs is it specified that Qaddafi 
should resign. Moreover, paragraph 4 which licenses the use of forcible measures does 
not specify as an aim to make Qaddafi resign and secure regime change. A regime 
change may be the effect of permissible military action pursuant to resolution 1973 but 
it cannot be the objective for military operations.127  
 
When interpreting Security Council resolutions authorizing the use of armed force 
under Chapter VII resort should be taken to the lotus principle, asserting that limitations 
on sovereignty shall not be presumed.128 Thus Security Council resolution 1973 should 
be interpreted strictly to its objective of civilian protection.  
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Both the UN Secretary-General as well as several of the member states implementing 
resolution 1973 has spoken on the objective of the mandate. In its Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion the International Court of Justice mentioned ‘subsequent practice of relevant 
United Nations organs’ as a relevant factor of interpretation.129 The Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon, an organ of the UN, had on a number of occasions expressed his opinion 
on the aim of resolution 1973. In an encounter with journalists on March 24, the 
Secretary-General said that resolution 1973 was not aiming for regime change but to 
protect civilians ‘because Colonel Qaddafi has been killing his own people.’130 On 
April 13, on the meeting of the International Contact Group on Libya, Ban Ki-moon 
repeated that the paramount objective throughout the Libyan crisis had been ‘to protect 
civilians from violence perpetrated by their own government.’131 The subsequent 
practice of the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon underscored that the aim of the 
resolutions was to protect civilians against the violence perpetrated by the Libyan 
Government, not to change the regime.  
 
As the Court mentioned in its Kosovo Advisory Opinion, also the subsequent practice 
of states affected by the resolution is a relevant factor of interpretation. On the question 
of whether defeating Qaddafi was allowed if this was the most effective way to protect 
civilians, Eide answered that Norway was of the opinion that Qaddafi had lost the 
legitimacy to rule and that a majority rule would be easier if he resigned or if someone 
forced him to resign.132 Nevertheless, Eide underscored that the coalition did not have 
the mandate to do so.133   
  
The President of South Africa, Zuma, has throughout the NATO operation held that the 
bombing in Libya should be ended and that the NATO forces have been seeking a 
regime change in Libya in an unacceptable manner.134 Also the African Union opinions 
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that the military operation carried out in Libya is in contradiction of its original 
mandate. The African Union thus opinions that the military operation carried out in 
Libya is in contradiction of its original mandate. The African Union held a special 
session on Libya on May 25 and demanded ‘an immediate pause in the fighting and in 
the NATO‐led air campaign.’ ‘In this respect, the Assembly is of the well‐considered 
view that the continuation of the NATO‐led military operation defeats the very purpose 
for which it was authorized in the first place, i.e. the protection of the civilian 
population, and further complicates any transition to a democratic dispensation in 
Libya.’135  
 
In the midst of the ongoing debate on whether NATO and its allies acted in violation of 
the Security Council mandate, on April 14 2011 President Barack Obama of the US, 
President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and British Prime Minister David Cameron 
published a joint article in several newspapers. The three state leaders pledged that 
NATO would protect civilians and stated that ‘so long as Qaddafi is in power, NATO 
must maintain its operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the 
regime builds’. They acknowledged that ‘our duty and our mandate under U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, and we are doing that. It is not to 
remove Qaddafi by force.’ Nevertheless, they claimed that ‘it is impossible to imagine a 
future for Libya with Qaddafi in power’136 and that a genuine transition from 
dictatorship to an including constitutional process could first really begin when Qaddafi 
had resigned, led by a new generation of leaders.137 They further stressed that ‘it will be 
the people of Libya, not the UN, who choose their new constitution, elect their new 
leaders and write the next chapter in their history.’138  
 
Indeed, when making statements, state leaders are often cautious in their language and 
they may not always use legal language in their assessment of the justification for a use 
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of force.139 Legally speaking the state leaders does acknowledge that the objective 
under resolution 1973 is to protect civilians against the Qaddafi regime. However, 
politically, all three see Qaddafi’s resignation as the only solution to the conflict and 
thus NATO will continue its operations until Qaddafi resigns. The joint article, thus 
seems to contain a contradiction as even though the mandate does not allow them to 
remove Qaddafi by force, NATO will ‘continue its operations so that civilians remain 
protected and the pressure on the regime builds’, operations that will include use of 
force. In the statements above, the three state leaders acknowledge that the mandate 
does not allow for the removal of Qaddafi by force. 
 
In brief, the subsequent practice of the Secretary-General and the affected states seems 
to agree that the objective of the resolution is strictly to protect the civilian population, 
while some of them has politically uttered that Qaddafi must resign.  
 
Whether the military airborne action carried out while the rebels advances on Qaddafi-
held territory is within the mandate again raises the question as to how remote the 
connection between the threat of attack and those posing it may be. Even though the 
mandate seems to also permit responses to more indirect and distant attacks, an 
adequate connection must be established between the threat of attack and those posing 
it.  
 
Could the regime of Qaddafi be said to pose a persistent threat against the civilian 
population? Indeed, Qaddafi had insistently promised to fight to the end. Again on 
September 1 2011, casted on an Arabic satellite channel, Qaddafi warned the alliance 
from further warfare and held that he would never surrender.140 On the other side, the 
linkage to the threat of attack on the civilian population was not so apparent when it 
came to providing assistance to rebel forces in their effort to conquer Qaddafi held 
territory.  
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The factual situation when the allies launched airstrikes as the rebels advanced on new 
areas was that the allies assisted the rebels in taking these areas from Qaddafi’s forces. 
Even though Qaddafi had promised to attack the rebels, it was in fact Qaddafi’s forces 
that were being attacked when the rebels advanced. Actually, when the rebels advanced 
on the Qaddafi held areas, the rebels themselves posed civilians and civilian populated 
areas under threat of attack. To assist the rebels would hence be to act in contradiction 
to the mandate of paragraph 4 of resolution 1973.  
 
What NATO could have done instead of providing assistance for the rebels when these 
advanced on Qaddafi-held territories was to confine itself principally to standing by and 
attacking whenever civilians or civilian populated areas were being put at risk. 
 
In conclusion, the airstrikes carried out while the rebels advanced on Qaddafi-held 
territories constitute a breach of resolution 1973 and are therefore illegal.   
  40 
 
3.4 Does Security Council resolution 1973 permit the coalition to arm the 
Libyan rebels?  
In the end of March 2011 the question of whether or not resolution 1973 allowed 
countries to arm the Libyan rebels became pressing as the rebels struggled to overpower 
Qaddafi’s tanks and rockets.141 Both the US and the UK argued that providing arms for 
the rebels would not be in breach of the arms embargo imposed by Security Council 
resolution 1970, while the NATO Secretary General said that resolution 1973 did not 
permit the coalition to arm the rebels.142 In June the French newspaper Le Figaro 
reported that France had dropped a wide variety of weapons to support the rebels, 
including rocket launchers and anti-tank missiles. France confirmed that it had provided 
weapons to rebels in Libya fighting against Qaddafi’s forces.143 The armed forces 
spokesman, Thierry Burkhard, speaking on behalf of France said that France ‘dropped 
arms and means of self-defence, mainly ammunition’ and described the arms as ‘light 
infantry weapons of the rifle type.’144 This disclosure resumed the discussion of 
whether supplying the rebels with arms was within the scope and limits of resolution 
1973.  
 
Whether the supply of arms for the rebels by the allies was legal or not, is governed by 
the prohibition on the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the 
customary rule of non-intervention and Security Council resolution 1973. In its 
Nicaragua case the International Court of Justice decided that the arming of insurgents 
in a civil strife constitutes a breach of the general prohibition on the use of force145 and 
is also in breach of the rule of non-intervention.146 Absent an authorization in the 
Security Council resolution 1973 permitting the coalition forces to supply arms to the 
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Libyan rebels, the supplies of arms would be in violation of both the prohibition on the 
threat of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the rule of non-intervention.   
 
The issue to address is whether Security Council resolution 1973 permits arming the 
rebels in the civil war.  
 
The concrete legal basis for the discussion is paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 which 
authorizes the use of ‘all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 
1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in 
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.’ 
 
While paragraph 4 authorizes all necessary measures, i.e. the use of armed force, in 
order to achieve the objective of civilian protection, there is at the same time an arms 
embargo on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The arms embargo is initially established by 
paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 which stipulates that all the member states of the UN 
shall ‘take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or 
transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya … of arms and related materiel of all types.’147 
With this provision the Council effectively imposes an arms embargo on the whole 
territory of Libya, preventing any transfer of arms into the territory of the country. The 
provision does not only prevent transfers to the loyalists of the Qaddafi regime, it 
covers everybody in Libya.    
 
Although the established arms embargo is continued and provided stronger enforcement 
for in paragraphs 13-16 of resolution 1973, paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 makes a 
specific reference to the arms embargo when it authorizes member states to take ‘all 
necessary measures… notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya.’  
 
The word ‘notwithstanding’ is in Oxford English Dictionary explained as to be of the 
same substance as ‘in spite of,’ ‘although,’ ‘nevertheless’ and ‘all the same’. A textual 
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reading of the phrase ‘notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970’ in paragraph 4 
implies that it authorizes the allies to take all necessary measures, in spite of the arms 
embargo imposed on Libya by paragraph 9 of resolution 1970. The text of paragraph 4 
thus seems to deviate somewhat from the general arms embargo established in 
paragraph 9 of resolution 1970.  
 
Regardless of the phrase ‘notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970,’ paragraph 4 
of resolution 1973 authorizes member states to take ‘all necessary measures,’ i.e. armed 
force, in pursuance of civilian protection. The license for the member states to use 
forcible measures necessarily implies that the allies use their own weapons within the 
territory of Libya, which includes Libya’s airspace and territorial waters.148 Indeed, if 
the states carrying out the mandate were not permitted to bring their own arms for their 
own use into the territory of Libya, then the license to use all necessary measures would 
be meaningless. The authorization to use armed force thus implicitly makes an 
exception from the general arms embargo, permitting the allies to bring their own 
weapons for own usage into Libya.   
 
When the Council in paragraph 4 licenses the use of armed force in the broad phrase of 
‘all necessary measures’ to achieve civilian protection, it does not only make an 
exception from the general rules on non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of 
force, it also constitutes an exception from the specific provisions on the arms embargo 
initially established in paragraph 9 of resolution 1970, and then reinforced in resolution 
1973. This implies that the resort to armed force is allowed only in the degree that it is 
restrictively directed towards the objective of civilian protection.  
 
As a relevant factor in the process of interpreting Security Council resolutions, the 
International Court of Justice in its Kosovo Advisory Opinion mentions ‘other 
resolutions of the Security Council on the same issue.’ This clearly includes other 
resolutions on the situation in Libya. However, the interpretation factor seems to not 
only cover resolutions on the precise same crisis, but also resolutions of similar 
substances. The interpretation of past resolutions concerning similar legal issues could 
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shed light on how related constructions in other resolutions are to be understood. On the 
other hand, in the political tug of war in which a draft resolution is made, the Council 
more often focuses on political aims than on the need for consistency from resolution to 
resolution. This, as well as the obvious fact that all actual situations differ from each 
other, means that when looking at the interpretation of earlier resolutions due caution 
must be taken.  
 
The interpretation of the relation between the established arms embargo under Security 
Council resolution 733 (1992) on Somalia and resolution 794 (1992) can shed light on 
the interpretation of resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya.149 Even though Security 
Council resolution 733 (1992) imposed ‘a general and complete embargo on all 
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia,’ it was implicitly modified by 
resolution 794 (1992) which authorized the use of ‘all necessary means to establish… a 
secure environment for humanitarian relief’.150 Despite the arms embargo established in 
resolution 733, the two resolutions seen in combination did not forbid the states which 
implemented the mandate in resolution 794 to bring their own arms for their own use 
into the territory of Somalia.151  
 
The interpretation of the legal framework in Somalia suggests that when the Security 
Council authorizes the member states to take enforcement action under resolution 1973 
on Libya, the general arms embargo does not apply to the member states when carrying 
out the mandate.  
 
The text of resolution 1973, its purpose as well as the interpretation of the Council’s 
resolutions on Somalia, show that the arms embargo in paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 
does not apply to member states when acting within the mandate of the Council.  
 
Even if the allies can bring their own arms for their own use, can they also provide the 
rebels with arms?  
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Under international law, as acknowledged by the Court in its Nicaragua case, force can 
be used directly, through the state’s own forces, or indirectly, in the manner of 
providing assistance to non-state actors.152 Paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 explicitly 
directs the authorization to use all necessary means to ‘Member States… acting 
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements’. Pursuant to the 
resolution, states can thus operate alone, in an ad hoc coalition, through a regional 
organization such as NATO or in a combination of these.153 Paragraph 4 does not 
specify whether the member state’s resort to armed force must be conducted by the 
member state itself or if the member state can use force indirectly, in the form of 
assistance by supplying arms. When it is acknowledged that force may be taken both 
directly or indirectly in international law, and the mandate in paragraph 4 does not limit 
the use of force to directly be taken by the state, such a limitation should not be 
interpreted into the text.  
 
The limitation the paragraph does in fact impose is that the use of force must be 
directed at aiming the objective of civilian protection. Not only the direct use of force 
but also to use force indirectly, may be taken to achieve the objective. Thus also the use 
of indirect force is allowed for in paragraph 4 of resolution 1973.  
 
In its Kosovo Advisory Opinion the Court also acknowledged the importance of the 
interpretation of a resolution and the discussions of the member states in the Council 
meeting where the resolution was adopted. In the Council meeting where resolution 
1973 was adopted none of the countries debated the possibility of providing arms for 
the rebels. However, a number of states expressed that any armed intervention should 
be limited. South Africa generally urged that the resolution should ‘be implemented in 
full respect for both its letter and spirit,’ and the countries which absented from the vote 
all took a highly restrictive approach to any form of armed intervention in Libya. The 
opinioned views of a limited military intervention indicate that a narrow approach to the 
interpretation of the mandate should be taken, and thus that resolution 1973 did not 
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intend to permit for an exception from the general arms embargo in order to provide 
weapons to the rebels.  
 
In its Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the Court further included as a relevant factor in the 
interpretation of resolutions the ‘subsequent practice… of States affected by [the] given 
resolutions.’ Only Qatar and France, states enforcing the mandate of resolution 1973, 
have admitted to arming the rebels.154  
 
The prime minister of Qatar, Sheikh Hamas bin Jassem, held that UN resolution 1973 
permits the supply of ‘defensive weapons’ to the opposition forces in Libya. The Qatari 
government did not want to elaborate in detail on the arms deliveries, but said that the 
weapons provided for the rebels were ‘equipment so they can defend themselves.’155 
French Permanent Representative to the UN, Gerard Araud, explained the French air 
drops of weapons in similar words as Qatar, emphasizing that the air drops concerned 
weapons of self-defence ‘to the civilian populations because we considered these 
populations were under threat.’156 Although the media reported that France had also 
dropped rocket launchers, which are especially used as offensive weapon,157 France has 
not made any comment on this.  
 
Both Qatar and France underscored that the arms provided for were mainly arms of 
self-defence, which made it seem as if the two countries legalized the arm drops in that 
it was done to achieve the objective of resolution 1973, to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack.  
 
Even though the UK and the US have not provided weapons to the rebels, both have 
uttered their support of the decision of Qatar and France to arm the rebels and argued 
that to arm the rebels was legal. In March, US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, 
argued that although UN sanctions prohibited the delivery of arms to Libya, the ban no 
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longer applied. ‘It is our interpretation that [resolution] 1973 amended or overrode the 
absolute prohibition on arms to anyone in Libya,’ she said.158 US President, Barack 
Obama, supported the view presented by Clinton when stating that he did not rule out 
arming the rebels seeking to overthrow Qaddafi.159 The US thus opinioned that the text 
in paragraph 4 resolution 1973 in general amended the initial arms embargo.   
 
On the reading of the two resolutions the UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague, held in 
March that even though the arms embargo applied to the whole of Libya, it ‘might 
allow equipment to be given to people purely to defend themselves in certain 
circumstances in a limited way.’160 After becoming aware that France had armed the 
rebels, a spokesman of the British Foreign Office said that ‘There is an arms embargo in 
Libya. At the same time UN resolution 1973 allows all necessary measures to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas… We think that the United Nations resolution 
allows in certain limited circumstances defensive weapons to be provided’.161 Similar to 
the US, the UK focused on that the text of paragraph 4 provided for an exception from 
the arms embargo.   
 
Nevertheless, Russia and China, the key permanent members whose non-opposition to 
resolution 1973 was crucial to its passage, as well as NATO and Norway, have 
opinioned that arming the rebels was not within the scope of resolution 1973.  
 
When the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, was confronted with the arms 
supply by France, he said that ‘if this is confirmed, it is a very crude violation of UN 
Security Council resolution 1970 [which imposes an arms embargo on Libya].’162 In 
response to the same confrontation, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, 
called ‘on the international community to strictly follow the spirit of the relevant 
resolution of the U.N. Security Council and avoid taking any action that goes beyond 
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the mandate of the resolution.’163 While not criticizing France explicitly, it was evident 
from Hong Lei`s response that China disapproved of France`s arming of the Libyan 
opposition.  
 
On a question of whether Security Council resolution 1973 permits the coalition forces 
to arm the Libyan rebels, NATO Secretary-General, Rasmussen answered that ‘we are 
not in Libya to arm people. We are in Libya to protect civilians against attacks.’164 The 
Norwegian Minister of Defence, Faremo, emphasized that the UN mandate was about 
protecting civilians and that supplying the rebels with arms was thus out of the 
question.165 She furthermore underscored that due to the arms embargo on the whole 
territory of Libya it was not allowed to transfer weapons to the country.166  
 
Using the argument of the overriding aim of civilian protection in a complete opposite 
standing compared to how Qatar and France argued, the NATO Secretary-General and 
Norway emphasized that the overall aim of civilian protection in the resolution 
indicated that arming of rebels was outside the scope of the mandate.  
 
Even though the intention of some members of the Security Council indicates that the 
resolution should be interpreted strictly, the text of resolution 1973 does not in itself 
exclude indirect use of force, including assistance by providing arms. Furthermore, as 
NATO, Norway, France and Qatar seemed to emphasize that what is determinative for 
the legality of arming the rebels is the objective of civilian protection, as arming the 
rebels is not necessarily an excluded measure under paragraph 4 of resolution 1973. 
Nevertheless, any supply of arms to the rebels is indeed limited by the objective in 
paragraph 4 of resolution 1973.  
 
Paragraph 4 authorizes forcible measures directed solely towards the protection of 
‘civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.’ Any supply of arms to the 
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rebels must thus be conducted to achieve the objective of civilian protection. To supply 
the rebels with arms in pursuance of other aims is not permitted by paragraph 4 of 
resolution 1973. Any supply of arms directed at other aims will be in violation of the 
general arms embargo established in paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 as well as the rule 
of non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter.    
  
The issue to be discussed is thus if arming the rebels is directed towards protection of 
‘civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.’ 
 
Weapons in general are regarded as instruments used in warfare or combat to attack or 
overcome an enemy.167 Hardly any weapons can be used only for defensive purposes. 
Also the kind of light infantry weapons, as the rifle, that France supplied the rebels 
with, can be used for offensive purposes.  
 
The chairperson of the African Union, Jean Ping, has been highly negative to France’s 
decision to air-drop weapons to Libyan rebels. In its Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the 
Court did not mention the practice of regional organizations such as the African Union 
as a relevant factor of interpretation. However, as the Court did not make an exhausted 
list of factors, also other factors might be relevant. In resolution 1973 the Security 
Council took note of the condemnation of, and the communiqué of the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union on the situation in Libya, which shows that the 
Council emphasizes the opinion of the African Union on the situation in Libya. This is 
further supported by the speeches of the member states in the Council meeting where 
resolution 1973 was adopted, where a majority of the states which spoke of the 
resolution commended the importance of the work of the African Union on the situation 
in Libya. This shows that also practice combined with prior or subsequent statements of 
representatives who speak on behalf of the African Union is relevant in the 
interpretation of the resolutions on Libya.  
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Ping explained the disapproval of the Union in respect of the supply of arms for the 
rebels in Libya in terms of the negative effect such a supply might have. Ping held that 
weapons distributed in Libya would put the whole region at risk’168 and contribute to 
the ‘destabilization’ of African states. Ping said that ‘what worries us is not who is 
giving what, but simply that weapons are being distributed. By all parties, and to all 
parties.’ Ping further claimed that the weapons distributed to the rebels were already 
reaching al-Qaeda and traffickers.169 In fact the coalition has admitted that it was not 
clear who the Libyan opposition group was or that some of the opposition fighters had 
al-Qaeda links.170   
 
On the one hand, a supply of weapons will aim at the objective of civilian protection 
when the rebels use these to defend the areas they are in control of from attacks by 
Qaddafi’s forces. On the other hand, when the arms have been distributed to the rebels 
in the purpose of civilian protection, the allies are no longer in control of what purposes 
those arms are then used to achieve. The weapons provided for in the intention of 
defensive usage, can be used also for offensive purposes, and might even come into the 
hands of other non-state groups. The weapons could, and most likely would, be used by 
the rebels when these advance on cities held by Qaddafi’s forces. In this case, it is the 
rebels themselves who pose a threat of attack on civilians and civilian populated areas, 
which the member states of the UN have a mandate to halt.171 The weapons are then 
used for offensive purposes and do no longer serve the aim of civilian protection. This 
discussion shows that to supply the rebels with arms does not improve the objective of 
civilian protection and thus goes beyond the mandate of paragraph 4 in resolution 1973.     
 
In conclusion, Security Council resolution 1973 does not permit the coalition to arm the 
Libyan rebels. The supply of arms to the rebels is thus illegal.   
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3.5 Does Security Council resolution 1973 permit the coalition to deploy 
ground forces in Libya?     
In March 2011 President Obama of the US stated that he had no intention of sending 
ground combat troops into Libya.172 Also NATO Secretary-General, Rasmussen, has 
said that NATO will not deploy ground troops in Libya and has uttered that Security 
Council resolution 1973 does not authorize the use of forces on the ground.173 
Nevertheless, newspapers report about CIA teams,174 British agents, Special Forces and 
military experts and advisors operating on Libyan territory.175  
 
Both the prohibition on the use of force in international relations in Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter and the customary rule on non-intervention in internal affairs forbid the 
deployment of foreign ground forces in the territory of another state. Without an 
authorization in Security Council resolution 1973 permitting the member states to 
position foreign armed forces on Libyan territory, such an operation would be in breach 
of the rule on non-intervention and the prohibition in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  
 
The thesis will now address whether Security Council resolution 1973 permits the use 
of foreign ground forces on Libyan territory.   
 
Paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 authorizes ‘all necessary measures to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya… 
while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.’ 
The provision explicitly excludes the measure of ‘a foreign occupation force of any 
form’ from the authorization to use forcible measures. An ordinary reading of the clause 
indicates that it does not prohibit any kind of trans-frontier armed ground forces, only 
those which qualify as an ‘occupation force.’ The text of resolution 1973 does not 
provide for a definition of the implemented term ‘occupation force.’  
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Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention recognizes that other relevant rules of 
international law may be taken into account in the process of interpretation. 
International humanitarian law, more specifically Article 42 of the Hague Relations, 
sets fort two criteria for a military operation to qualify as an ‘occupation’ for the 
purpose of the provisions of the Hague Relations.  
 
The first condition is that the territory has been ‘placed under the authority of the hostile 
army.’ The former government hence no longer exercises its authority of that area.176 
The second condition is that ‘authority has been established and can be exercised’ over 
the territory. An ordinary understanding of the phrase indicates a requirement of actual 
establishment of authority. In respect of this second condition, the International Court 
of Justice in its case Armed Activities case placed emphasis on that the Ugandan forces 
had exercised authority in the Ituri Province of DRC, thus Uganda was an occupying 
power there.177  
 
Responsibilities attach to occupying forces at the time of occupation, as for example the 
duty to restore and maintain public order pursuant to Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations. As Judge Kooijmans of the Court highlighted in his separate opinion on 
the Armed Activities case,178 an invading army cannot avoid its obligations derived of 
being the occupying power merely by refraining from actually exercising authority in 
the area it is in control of.179 For the occupying force to carry out these responsibilities 
it is sufficient that it has the effective, factual control or authority over the area, it is not 
essential that it has established an authority on the area.   
 
At least in relation to the obligations under Geneva Convention IV and Additional 
Protocol I it is widely accepted that the obligations of forces present in an armed 
conflict in a foreign territory do not depend on whether or not the forces actually 
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exercise public authority there.180 It is generally accepted that it is sufficient that the 
occupying force has effective control over the territory.181 Effective control simply 
entails that the occupying force is able to exercise its authority in the occupied area, it 
does not have to be present there at all times.182  
 
In brief, the regime of military occupation thus refers to a situation where the armed 
forces of one or more states exercise effective control over the territory of another state, 
absent the consent of the former state’s government.183  
 
The extent to which the content of the technical term ‘occupation’, given in respect of 
the Hague Relations, provides guidance in the interpretation of the similar term in 
resolution 1973, depends on the intentions of the Security Council.  
 
Also statements by representatives in the meeting where the resolution was adopted are 
a recognized factor of interpretation.184 A number of the representatives in the meeting 
commented on the term ‘a foreign occupation force.’  
 
The representative of Lebanon underscored that the resolution ‘will not result in the 
occupation of any part of Libyan territory,’ while the spokesman of Colombia stressed 
that Columbia did not vote in favor of ‘the occupation of a State’.185 Further, the 
representative of Nigeria maintained that ‘foreign occupation is not an option to secure 
peace in Libya’ and that resolution 1973 specifically excludes that possibility.186 The 
shared view of these countries is thus that foreign occupation is out of the question, but 
their statements did not provide further guidance of the exact content of a ‘foreign 
occupation force’.   
 
                                                 
180 Benvenisti (2009) 
181 Benvenisti (2009) 
182 Benvenisti (2009) 
183 Benvenisti (2009) 
184 Kosovo Declaration of Independence, para.94 
185 UN Doc.S/PV.6498 
186 UN Doc.S/PV.6498 
  53 
The representative of Russia uttered that the draft was transcending the initial concept 
as submitted by the League of Arab States and that ‘provisions were introduced into the 
text that could potentially open the door to large-scale military intervention.’187 
Contrariwise to the statement of the representative of Russia, the delegation of South 
Africa stated that the resolution ‘rejects any foreign occupation or unilateral military 
intervention under the pretext of protecting civilians.’188 The spokesman further 
emphasized that the adopted resolution is in consistence with the decision of the African 
Union Peace and Security Council ‘to respect the unity and territorial integrity of Libya 
and its rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form.’189 The 
delegation of South Africa seemed to equal the term ‘foreign occupation’ with ‘foreign 
military intervention’. There is a discrepancy between the statements of Russia, saying 
that large-scale military intervention is a possibility, and South Africa who claimed that 
military intervention and foreign occupation is prohibited. Neither of the two countries 
provided for a closer description of their understanding of the expression ‘military 
intervention’, and their statements does therefore not give further guidance as for the 
content of the term ‘foreign occupation force.’  
 
The term the Council agreed to implement in the text of resolution 1973 was a ‘foreign 
occupation force’ and not military intervention. Except from the statement of South 
Africa, it does not seem as if the Council intended to deviate from the content the term 
‘occupation’ has been given pursuant to the Hague Relations. The expression ‘a foreign 
occupation force’ can therefore be understood in light of the content given to the similar 
term in the Hague Relations.  
 
In order for ground forces in Libya to qualify as a ‘foreign occupation force’ these must 
thus have the factual control over any part of the territory.     
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In its Kosovo Advisory Opinion the Court also said that subsequent practice of states 
affected by the resolution can provide guidance in the interpretation.190 In April media 
reported that British Special Forces soldiers were already operating in Libya. By mid-
April, Britain, France and Italy all reported that they were to send military experts to act 
as advisors to Libya’s opposition forces.191  
 
While sending such experts, advisors and instructors, leaders of all the three countries 
insisted that NATO would not escalate its presence in Libya.192 Cameron underscored 
that the UN Security Council resolutions meant that the allies were ‘not allowed, 
rightly, to have an invading army.’193 On the question of whether he categorically ruled 
out any form of ground force, Cameron replied that ‘what I’ve said is there is no 
occupying force, no invasion.’194 Cameron thus seemed to draw a line between the 
legality of the ground troops he had deployed in Libya, the Special Forces and military 
advisors, and an occupation force which was prohibited by the mandate.  
 
While President Obama of the US has uttered that he will not send ground combat 
troops into Libya, newspapers have reported of CIA activities in Libyan territory. In a 
meeting in Washington concerning the US operations in Libya, the US Defence-
Secretary, Robert Gates, declined to comment on questions about CIA activities in the 
country.195  
 
Even though the subsequent practice of these states is not consistent and not much 
information is shared on the activities of these ground troops, it does nevertheless seem 
to indicate that the phrase ‘foreign occupation force’ does not rule out all forms of 
foreign military personnel on Libyan territory.   
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In brief, paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 explicitly draws the outer limit of the operation 
in Libya, by specifically excluding a ‘foreign occupation force.’ Applying the content 
the term has been given pursuant to the Hague Relations, what is prohibited by the 
mandate is a foreign force which exercises effective control on any part of the Libyan 
territory.  
 
The foreign ground forces deployed by NATO and its allies in Libya participate in the 
civil war by giving military advice to the rebels, pointing out targets for accurate 
airstrikes at these and other war acts. However, these ground forces do not seek to take 
effective control over any part of the Libyan territory. The rebels and the pro-Qaddafi 
forces are in control of and fight to enlarge their parts of the territory. Even if the 
foreign ground forces provide support to one of the parties in the civil war, the foreign 
forces are under the control of that part, and do not seek to gain control over the 
territory themselves.  
 
The actual use of ground forces in Libya, i.e. the deployment of military experts and 
advisors, Special Forces and CIA agents are not of the intensity as to qualify as an 
occupation force. These ground forces are therefore not prohibited as a measure of a 
foreign occupation force under paragraph 4 of resolution 1973. Nonetheless, whether 
these forces are indeed permitted under paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 depends on 
whether their actions are directed exclusively towards the protection of ‘civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack.’  
 
In conclusion, Security Council resolution 1973 permits the coalition forces to deploy 
ground forces in Libya.  
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4 Conclusion 
In both resolutions 1970 and 1973 the Security Council made explicit reference to the 
responsibility to protect. In a statement following the adoption of resolution 1973 the 
UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, apprehended the resolution as an affirmation of 
the international community’s determination to implement its responsibility to 
protect.196  
 
In the General Assembly dialogue on the responsibility to protect held in July 2011 
while the crisis in Libya was still enduring, forty three Member States, three 
representatives from regional organizations and four representatives from civil society, 
expressed their views on the responsibility to protect.197 During the debate most 
member states voiced support for the principle and supported its continued 
implementation. However, several countries raised concern with regard to the manner in 
which NATO used force to implement resolution 1973 in Libya. Mexico underscored 
that differences in the interpretation of the resolution’s mandate had negatively affected 
the response of states on other international issues. The General Assembly President 
acknowledged that in the aftermath of the present crisis the remaining challenge was to 
ensure a coherent and impartial implementation of the responsibility to protect.  
 
While China and Russia did not want to block a collective action to save civilians 
suffering from atrocities in Libya, they early declared that they will not contemplate any 
similar armed operation in Syria, regardless of the atrocities the regime of president 
Bashar al-Assad inflict on civilian opponents. On October 4, the two joined forces to 
veto the proposed Security Council resolution condemning Syria.198 When explaining 
its abstention, Russia emphasized that in the proposed draft there was no wording on the 
                                                 
196 UN Press Release SG/SM/13454 
197 UN Doc. GA/11112 
198 UN Doc. S/PV.6627 
  57 
non-acceptability of foreign intervention. Russia underscored that it did not wish for a 
military operation similar to the one carried out by NATO and the allies in Libya.  
 
As envisaged in regard of the vetoed draft on Syria, the military operation in Libya can 
make it more difficult to unite the Security Council, which is a political body, on future 
decisions when it comes to the protection of civilians. Despite the ongoing work in the 
UN in order to implement the responsibility to protect, the responsibility is thus still a 
moral or political, rather than a legal, undertaking.199 The obligation for the 
international community to protect populations with military action in a last resort can 
only be fulfilled in accordance with a legal right to resort to forcible measures, for 
example, authorized by the Security Council under its Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
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